humlifeval.ms [text]

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Fearnside, P.M. 1998. The value of human life in global warming impacts. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change<= /u> 3(1): 83-85.

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ISSN: <= /span> 1381-2386

Copyrig= ht: Springer

The original pub= lication is available at http://www.springerlink.com:

THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE IN GLOBAL WARMING IMPACTS

&nb= sp; Philip M. Fearnside

&nb= sp; National Institute for Research

&nb= sp; = in the Amazon (INPA)

&nb= sp; Caixa Postal 478

&nb= sp; 69011-970 Manaus, Amazonas

&nb= sp; BRAZIL

&nb= sp; Tel: +55 (92) 643-1822

&nb= sp; Fax: +55 (92) 236-3822

&nb= sp; e-mail: pmfearn@inpa.gov.br

&nb= sp; 22 Oct. 1997

ABSTRACT:

A recent article = in Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change by Fankhauser and Tol makes= monetary estimates of potential global warming damages that assign higher value to e= ach life lost in wealthy countries as opposed to poor ones. Regardless of how much sense such a procedure may make to GDP-oriented economists, it is morally unacceptable to most of the world and needlessly damages efforts to build support for any global warming mitigation and adaptation strategies that may be proposed. A better solution would be to use a money value of zero for human life losses and report separately the monetary and human life costs of warming (and benefits of mitigation).

KEYWORDS: VALUATION, ETHICS, STATISTICAL LIFE, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING

No subject could = be as fundamental, nor as controversial, as the value attributed to human life in= calculating the impacts of global warming (and the benefits of mitigating it). Although prominent in the discussi= ons of activist groups (e.g., Third World Resurgence, 1994), this subject h= as received little treatment in the professional literature. A perception that those who work professionally with climate mitigation and adaptation value the lives of ri= ch people more than those of poor people is extremely damaging to the whole enterprise of mobilizing support for measures to contain global warming. The recent article in Mitigatio= n and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change by Fankhauser and Tol (1997) requires comment in this regard.

Fankhauser and Tol (1997: 400) state that "the value people assign to a lower mortality r= isk may rise as per capita income grows."= One is strongly reminded of the famous televised remark by General William Westmoreland, then U.S. military commander in Vietnam, that "they" [Vietnamese] don't feel pain on losing their loved ones li= ke "we" [Americans] do. The notion that global warming impacts should be calculated assigning greater v= alue to lives lost in rich countries has been rejected as morally unacceptable by many analysts, including this author (e.g. Fearnside, 1997).

The perception th= at global warming impact calculations contain a bias against the poor stems fr= om a 1992 working paper by the first author of the recent article. In that calculation, lives lost in wealthy countries were counted at a value ten times that used for lives los= t in the poorest countries (Fankhauser, 1992: 14). The values per life were derived f= rom what people spend on insurance, a measure that ultimately rests on the abil= ity of people to pay to avoid risks--that is, on how much money they have. Although Fankhauser (1992: note 22) appended a footnote explaining that poor people's lives are really just as valuable as rich people's lives, the numerical calculations followed throug= h to the end using the 10:1 ratio.

The Intergovernme= ntal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group 3 (Mitigation and Adaptation) analysis reviews various means of valuating human lives (Pearce et al., 1996: 196-197). The bottom li= ne of 1.5-2.0% loss of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (2-9% of GDP in develop= ing countries) for total impacts of doubling the pre-industrial CO₂ concentration presented in the conclusions (Pearce et al., 1996: 218= ), however, is based on "available studies" that virtually all have wealth-based valuation of human life. Most emphasis is given to Fankhauser's (1995) estimate, which gives = 11 times more weight to each life lost in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries as compared to the non-OECD [i.e., poor] countries (see Pearce et al., 1996: 197). In the present case (Fankhauser an= d Tol, 1997), which builds on the IPCC analysis, the numbers also reflect the "wealthist" bias of the original sources.

In addition, the "value adjustment" alluded to in the abstract (p. 385) is explain= ed (p. 398) as a probable increase in intangible damages "because of the = impact of per capita income on valuation."&n= bsp; The implication is that future refinements of damage evaluation calculations will contain higher numbers for mortality costs because the per capita income of the people dying will be greater. The source of Fankhauser and Tol's optimism regarding the direction of change of the per capita income of the victims is not stated, and seems incongruous with the recent trends towards much larger numbers and percentages of poor people in the world. That the authors' predictions about "a new generation of improved estimates" (p. 399) stress increased value per death based on future increases in per capita income implies that each death among the rich will add more to the global warming damage total = than each death among the poor.

It is important t= o make clear that, irrespective of what individual researchers may think about the matter, the value assigned to human life is a parameter that reflects ethic= al values that are not decided by researchers. The content of various internation= al agreements, including the United Nations charter, as well as the teachings = of the world's major religions, all point to equality as a universal guiding principle. This needs to be incorporated in an explicit and consistent manner into both numerical calculations and verbal discussions of the subject. The importance of equality is so b= asic that, rather than commit the injustice of differential valuation based on wealth, it would be better to use a value of zero for lost lives in monetary calculations, and simply state the monetary and human life costs separately= .

Using Fankhauser's (1995) estimates for the impact of a jump to double the pre-industrial CO2 concentration with the world (including its population size) as it is today, the result would be loss of US$ 221 billion (in 1990 prices) annually, exclusive of human life losses, plus loss of 138,000 lives per year (115,00= 0 of which would be in non-OECD countries).&nbs= p; The world's population can be expected to have grown substantially before pre-industrial CO₂ doubles in approximately 2070, assuming the atmosphere follows the IPCC Second Assessment Report's business-as-usual (IS92a) scenario (Schimel et al., 1996: 83). The real costs, especially in lost lives, would therefore be much higher than these already astronomical numbe= rs suggest.

References

Fankhauser, S.: 1992, Global warming damage costs: Some monetary estimates. Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERG) Working Pape= r GEC 92-29. London, University College and Norwich, University of East Anglia.

Fankhauser, S.: 1995, Valuing Climate Change--The Economics of the Greenhouse. London, EarthScan.

Fankhauser, S. and Tol, R.S.J.: 1997, 'The social costs of climate change: The IPCC Sec= ond Assessment Report and beyond', Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 1: 385-403.

Fearnside, P.M.: 1997, 'Environmental services as a strategy for sustainable developme= nt in rural Amazonia', Ecological Economics 20(1): 53-70.

Pearce, D.W., Cline, W.R., Achanta, A.N., Fankhauser, S., Pachauri, R.K., Tol, R.S.= J. and Velinga, P.: 1996, 'The social costs of climate change: Greenhouse dama= ge and the benefits of control', in Bruce, J.P., Lee, H. and Haites, E.F. (eds= .), Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions--Contributions of Working Group= III to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 179-224.<= /span>

Schimel, D. and 75 others: 1996, 'Radiative forcing of climate change', Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change--Contribution of Working Group I= to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Chan= ge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 65-131.

Third World Resurgence: 1994, 'World climate body colonised by OECD economists', Third World Resurgence <= b>49: 2-3.