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Fearnside, P.M. 2001. Saving tropical fo<=
/span>rests as a global warming countermeasure: An
issue that divides the environmental movement. Ecological Economic=
s 39(2): 167-184.
ISSN: <=
/span> 0921-8009
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ht: Elsevier
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SAVING
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; Philip
M. Fearnside
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; Department
of Ecology
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; National
Institute for Research
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; in the Amazon (INPA)
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp;
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
C.P.
478
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
69011-970
Manaus, Amazonas
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
BRAZIL
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
Fax:
+55-92-642-8909
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
Tel:
+55-92-643-1822
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
e-mail
pmfearn@inpa.gov.br
For: Ecological
Economics
=
&nb=
sp; =
revised:
=
COMMENTARY
=
=
Saving
tropical forests as a global warming countermeasure: an issue that divides =
the
environmental movement
=
Philip
M. Fearnside*
=
=
Department
of Ecology, National Institute for Research in the Amazon (INPA), Av. André Araújo, 2936, C.P. 478,
69011-970 Manaus, Amazonas, Brazil
Received _______
*Corresponding author. Fax:
+55-92-642-8909.
E-mail address:=
pmfearn@inpa.gov.br.
Abstract
Saving tropical forests as=
a
global warming countermeasure has become one of the environmental
movement’s most divisive issues. Divisions are just as sharp as the
better-known ones between government positions. While the debate is often couched =
in
scientific terms and with appeals to high universal principles, the positio=
ns
of the different partisans to the debate are better understood in terms of
hidden agendas, conscious or not.
In the case of European governments, which oppose inclusion of fores=
ts
in the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, the exclusion of
forests would lead to improvement of industrial competitiveness as compared=
to
the
Keywords: Global warming, Kyoto
Protocol, Deforestation, Tropical forest, Greenhouse gases, Non-Governmental
Organizations
1. Introduction
&n=
bsp; The
place of tropical forest conservation in efforts to combat global warming h=
as
become a source of sharp disagreement among environmental non-governmental =
organizations
(NGOs), and also, although they are very loathed to admit it, within their
ranks. This paper gives the
viewpoints of one participant in these controversies and makes no pretense =
of
detachment or neutrality. For
almost 20 years the author has been a strong advocate of slowing tropical
deforestation as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and much of =
his
professional work over this period has been devoted to providing the scient=
ific
basis, both in terms of data and theory, that is needed to make this
possible. This is part of a w=
ider
strategy to shift the support of human populations in tropical forest areas
such as Brazilian Amazonia from a system based on destroying the forest to =
one
based on maintaining the forest for its environmental services (Fearnside,
1997a).
&n=
bsp; The
positions of environmental NGOs on inclusion of avoided deforestation in the
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are tightly linked=
to
geography, with European NGOs opposing inclusion of forests, US NGOs (other
than US branches or affiliates of international groups) favoring inclusion =
of
forests, and Brazilian NGOs (also excepting most branches or affiliates of
international NGOs) also favoring forests.=
If=
one
were to represent opinions on this issue by throwing colored darts at a map=
of
the World, the chances of the colors representing these views being cluster=
ed
in
Much opposition to avo=
ided
deforestation as a supposed “loophole” stems from the belief th=
at
it is a “dangerous distraction” because “The way the Prot=
ocol
has been written, every ton of carbon absorbed by a sink allows a ton of ca=
rbon
to be emitted from burning fossil fuels” (WWF Climate Change Campaign, 2000). Fortunately, this interpretation is
mistaken because one does not need to make the assumption of a ratio of one=
-to-one
between the carbon maintained in the forests and the credit granted that al=
lows
fossil-fuel carbon to be emitted. More carbon can be maintained in t=
he
forests than the amount of carbon credit granted. In this way, even if the
carbon in the forests is temporary, at some point a net benefit exists for =
the
climate from having the forest project instead of a smaller reduction in
fossil-fuel emissions. If well negotiated, inclusion of forests can result =
in
concrete gains for global climate, in addition to large advantages in other
spheres. The same logic that
applies to permanence also applies other aspects of forest projects, such as
uncertainty and leakage.
Avoided deforestation should not be confused with
plantation silviculture, despite the two being virtually always lumped as
“sinks” in European NGO discourse (eg., Greenpeace Internationa=
l,
2000a,b; Hare and Meinshausen., 2000<=
/span>). They are very different, both in t=
erms
of carbon benefits and in terms of their impacts and benefits for biodivers=
ity
and social concerns. Avoided
deforestation almost always is more beneficial than tree plantations
(Fearnside, 1995, 1996a).
&=
nbsp; It
is very important to distinguish between what is a scientific conclusion and
what is a moral judgment. Sci=
ence
can provide answers to questions such as “how much carbon will a given
project hold out of the atmosphere, for how long and with what degree of
certainty.” It cannot tell us whether that answer means that the CDM
should include or exclude avoided deforestation. Such a conclusion requires moral
choices. We must have the cou=
rage
to admit that we are making moral decisions, and to go ahead and make
them. Decisions on the value =
of
time, as reflected in the discount rate and the time horizon, are based on =
the
value that society (represented by “decision makers”) places on=
a
suite of different considerations, such as the importance placed on present
versus future generations. The environmental price would be high if we throw
away a major opportunity to maintain tropical rainforest in exchange for an
expected climate benefit several centuries in the future.
People involved in the deb=
ates
over forests in the Kyoto Protocol are only rarely aware of underlying
motivations that affect the various positions, including their own. Most people are not consciously pu=
rsuing
a hidden agenda while cynically mouthing an intellectual argument. Rather, people are carried along b=
y the
social context in which they live: in general virtually everyone any given
individual knows is on the same side of the issue, and those on the other s=
ide
are painted in the blackest terms.
Trusted “trademarks” of known NGOs serve as substitutes =
for
individual analysis of the issues involved. For example, very few European
environmentalists chanting “Don’t sink the Protocol” could
explain the difference between an avoided emission and a sink, or the
assumptions and implications of time-preference choices underlying different
means of accounting for carbon.
&n=
bsp; In
the following pages I will suggest rationales for government and NGO positi=
ons
that explain such facts as the highly improbable geographical distribution =
of
opinions. These must be under=
stood
in the context of the role of tropical forests in climate change and the ca=
rbon
and non-carbon considerations in policy choices for mitigating global
warming. When viewed from the
perspective of the wider environmental concerns that many environmental NGOs
hope to address, one must conclude that those groups that oppose inclusion =
of
avoided deforestation in global-warming mitigation measures should rethink
their positions.
2. Tropical forests and
climate change
The United Nations Fra=
mework
Convention on Climate Change (UN-FCCC), signed by over 150 countries in
The statements by US President George W. Bush and
his spokespersons in March 2001 voicing opposition to the Kyoto Protocol as=
a
whole have shocked all those concerned with climate change. The urgency of pressuring the
Regardless=
of
what is decided in the coming months concerning the first commitment period=
of
the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012), or even on the fate of the Kyoto Protocol a=
s a
whole, the greenhouse effect will be with us for centuries to come, and, as=
its
impacts become more obvious and undeniable, the measures taken to combat it
will increase in scale. Soone=
r or
later the role of tropical forests will be recognized and incorporated into
global warming mitigation measures because the logic behind the carbon bene=
fits
of maintaining tropical forests is scientifically sound.
No option exists to do
nothing about global warming. “Business as Usual” scenarios
indicate tremendous impacts over the course of the 21st century
using the best available information, such as the “IS-92a”
scenarios in the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report or SAR (e.g., Pearce=
et
al., 1996). Developing countries are expected to bear the greatest losses f=
rom
global warming, especially human life losses. Under the obviously optimistic
assumption that world population does not grow after 1990, increased mortal=
ity
from doubling pre-industrial CO2 (i.e., in approximately 2070) w=
ould
be 138,000 lives/year (115,000 of which would be in developing countries),
while monetary losses independent of loss of life would be US$221billion/ye=
ar
in constant 1990 dollars according to the reference scenario used by the SAR
(Pearce et al., 1996, p. 197). The
realization that developing countries will suffer greatly has not yet
penetrated many developing countries.
For example in
&nbs=
p; Concern about the grav=
ity of
climate change and the urgency of action should not be confused with the
question of what should be done about it. One often sees European NGO present=
ations
beginning with dramatic statements on the gravity of climate change, follow=
ed
by condemnation of “sinks”.&nb=
sp;
The subliminal implication is that anyone who favors any
“sink”, a category in which European NGOs include avoided
deforestation, is somehow not concerned about combating climate change. This implication is quite erroneou=
s, as
those who favor crediting avoided deforestation are just as concerned about
climate change as anyone else; the difference of opinion is over what shoul=
d be
done about it.
The carbon emissions f=
rom
tropical land-use change indicate a substantial contribution to global warm=
ing.
For tropical countries throughout the World over the 1981-1990 period the n=
et emissions
from all clearing of natural vegetation and of secondary forests (including
both biomass and soil fluxes) was 2.0 X 109 t C, equivalent to
2.0-2.4 X 109 t of CO2-equivalent carbon considering =
the
global warming potentials adopted under the Kyoto Protocol. Adding emissions of 0.4 X 109=
t C from land-use category changes other than deforestation brings the total
for land-use change (not considering uptake of intact forest, recurrent bur=
ning
of savannas or fires in intact forests) to 2.4 X 109 t C, equiva=
lent
to 2.4-2.9 X 109 t of CO2‑equivalent carbon.
&nbs=
p; Deforestation
in Brazilian Amazonia releases quantities of greenhouse gases that are
significant both in terms of their present impact and in terms of the impli=
ed
potential for long-term contribution to global warming from continued clear=
ing of
3. Impasses in negotiation=
s
3.1. National positions
3.1.1. European Union
The representatives of=
the
European countries are the ones who press hardest for a reduction of the
inclusion of activities in tropical forests as measures to combat the
greenhouse effect (Table 1). The rationale given is that carbon in forests =
is
inherently at risk of emission to the atmosphere, and that the only accepta=
ble
form of mitigation should therefore be reduction of fossil fuel emissions
“at source”. Later on, the weakness of this justification will =
be
examined.
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; [Table
1 here]
The position of the Eu=
ropean
countries is best explained by the basic fact that fossil fuel prices are m=
uch
higher in
The hypocrisy of European countries in claiming =
that
their opposition to inclusion of avoided deforestation in the CDM stems from
concerns about permanence (the time that carbon remains out of the atmosphe=
re)
and certainty, as opposed to geopolitics, is shown by the priorities of the
same countries expressed outside the context of the Kyoto Protocol. In 1991, prior to both the June 19=
92
UN-FCCC and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,
3.1.2.
&nbs=
p; The
aversion of Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations to including forest
protection mystifies many people because of the very large potential benefi=
ts
to the country both from carbon revenue and from help in achieving national
objectives such as controlling deforestation. Deforestation in Brazilian
Amazonia produces little economic benefit because most of the deforested ar=
ea
becomes cattle pasture with low productivity and a tendency to degrade to
secondary forest (Fearnside, 1996b).
Reducing deforestation in Brazil represents a great opportunity to a=
void
carbon emissions because of the country’s large areas of remaining fo=
rest
and rapid rate of deforestation, because clearing could be substantial redu=
ced
on large cattle ranches with little economic loss or social hardship and
because Brazil could profitably accept an arrangement that grants a smaller
fraction of the “real” benefit in credit terms, thereby
guaranteeing an advantage for the atmosphere (Fearnside, 2000a,d).
The official justifica=
tions
of
A supposed institutional incapacity to reduce
deforestation is sometimes mentioned as a reason for
3.1.3.
Other Countries
&=
nbsp; Most tropical forest
countries in the Spanish-speaking portion of
&nbs=
p; The
“Umbrella Group” of the
3.2. NGO positions
&=
nbsp; The
fact that the climate sectors of the European head offices of four major
environmental NGOs (Greenpeace International, WWF-International, Birdlife
International and FOE-International) oppose inclusion of avoided deforestat=
ion
in the CDM (Table 1) is not easily understood – at least in terms of =
the
arguments presented. US branc=
hes or
affiliates of these NGOs follow the positions of the European head offices,=
but
the opposite position is held by major environmental NGOs headquartered in =
the
Environmental groups in
Environmental groups in
One reaction not infrequently heard to the
controversies around the world over forests in the CDM is that “IR=
17;m
so confused, I go to bed thinking one thing and get up thinking something
else”. However, no one =
is
confused who is closer to the heat of the burning in Amazonia, as evinced by
the positions of Brazilian NGOs, most of which support inclusion of forests
(“Manifestação...”, 2000; see Table 1), but a few=
do
not (“A Brazilian NGO Declaration”, 2000; see Table 1). Among the organizations supporting
inclusion of avoided deforestation are grassroots groups such as the Nation=
al
Council of Rubber Tappers (CNS), which is composed of people who both before
and after Chico Mendes have been living at the front lines of an environmen=
tal
battle that gives them much better credentials than anyone in European NGOs,
the Amazonian Working Group (GTA), which represents over 390 grassroots
organizations in Brazilian Amazonia, the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), wh=
ich
represents many small-farmer groups linked to the Catholic Church, the
Federation of Agricultural Workers of Pará (FETAGRI) that represents=
a
large number of small-farmer groups, and the Coordinating Body of Indigenous
Peoples of Brazilian Amazonia (COIAB), the largest indigenous peoples
group. These organizations su=
pport
forests in the CDM not as a result of decisions by a few leaders, but rather
after extended meetings and discussions with their memberships. The key
difference between the thinking of most Brazilian NGOs, especially grassroo=
ts
groups, and the ethereal intellectual arguments regarding permanence and
uncertainty is that in the grassroots groups the people know what it looks,
smells and feels like to be at the frontier where the forest is being
chain-sawed and burned.
It is interesting to note that, prior to the 1997
Kyoto Protocol, the climatic value of reducing tropical deforestation was
stressed by the same NGOs that now claim that only permanent offsets by
reducing fossil fuel use have value.
In a report for Friends of the Earth-UK, Norman Myers (1989) even
described the effect of plantations as “positive” for climate,
although these are now anathema to the same groups on carbon accounting
grounds. However, it is the shift in position on avoided deforestation, the
subject of the present paper, that
represents the greatest mystery.
It is difficult to understand how any environmen=
tal
organization could take a stand that implies throwing away one of the most
important opportunities for maintaining tropical forests. This is particularly so for
organizations like WWF and Birdlife International that have protection of
biodiversity as their primary purpose, since without tropical forests the
World’s biodiversity would be much reduced. The gain from attempting to force =
the
The counter proposal often raised by governments=
and
European-dominated NGOs opposed to forest inclusion is that forest protecti=
on
is a biodiversity concern and should be handled through the UN Framework
Convention on Biodiversity. Saying that tropical forests should be protected
with money from other sources, such as the Biodiversity Convention, is only=
a
diversion, since significant amounts of money simply do not exist in these
“other” sources. =
None
of the countries suggesting that these sources be used is offering to put
billions of dollars on the table.
&=
nbsp; The
same applies to suggestions that forest protection should be done with funds
from Articles 4.8 of the UN-FCCC and 12.8 of the Protocol (the
“adaptation fund”).
Setting up forest reserves in
A ceiling on use of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) projects is
likely to be adopted. It is
important to realize that this is a reflection of diplomatic reality rather
than of scientific argument. =
If
LULUCF carbon benefits are real and, one might presume, adjusted in value to
give a greater benefit to climate than fossil fuel carbon for each unit of
certified emissions reduction (CER), then it would be logical to use as much
LULUCF mitigation as possible rather than restricting it. A proportionality with the land-use
emissions of either the Annex I party or the global total does not follow
unless the CERs [Note: not the tons of actual carbon] are less beneficial to
climate if derived from forest rather than fossil fuels.
Greenpeace and other groups opposing forests in =
the
CDM base their argument on Article 2 of the UN-FCCC, which specifies the
criterion as “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interferen=
ce
with the climate system,” and Article 12, Paragraph 5(c) of the Proto=
col,
which calls for “long-term benefits.” The words
“stabilization” and “long-term” are interpreted to =
mean
that we should only be concerned about the state of the atmosphere when
equilibrium is reached centuries from now, and that what happens between now
and then has no importance for humankind. Theoretically, the difference bet=
ween
the positions in Europe and in Brazil could be explained if people in Brazil
were interested in their children and grandchildren and Europeans were only
interested in here generations at least 200 years in the future, but the
probability of a difference of this type in priorities for future generatio=
ns
is virtually zero, as people all over the World appear to be basically same=
in
their priorities for the future. Since any explanation of the motivations of
the different groups must explain the peculiar geographical distribution of
opinions, the public declarations and publications of the groups are of lit=
tle
usefulness. Other motivations, even if unconscious, are more probable.
The position of European NGOs can better be
understood in terms of a logic parallel to the motivations of the European
governments that want to improve European industrial competitiveness relati=
ve
to the
International NGOs should take stock of what they
are trying to accomplish. Organizations like WWF represent their membership=
s,
which are composed of people who contribute funds primarily because they are
concerned about biodiversity. In
the 21st Century the greatest threat to biodiversity is likely t=
o be
habitat loss, especially tropical deforestation. Only on longer timescales would cl=
imate
change rise to such major importance, and in this case would act mainly in =
finishing
off species that had escaped a century of direct habitat destruction. In the case of WWF, the organizati=
on
functions as a “network”, with major decisions being taken in
meetings of representatives of the different countries. Once a group decision is made, all=
of
the national offices are obliged to abide by it. This can go against the perception=
s of
people in countries like
4. Policy choices in
mitigating global warming
4.1. Carbon considerations=
4.4.1. Time and permanence
Permanence and other temporal issues represent an
area of resistance against inclusion of forests, since it is always possibl=
e that
forests could later be cut, degraded, or burned for some reason, thereby
releasing their carbon to the atmosphere.&=
nbsp;
Climatic change itself has become a weapon used in attacking forest
conservation as a mitigation option, on the grounds that many forests in
Fortunately, there are several factors that
counteract this effect. Most important is the implication of the argument
against forests that the same weight should be given to events in the prese=
nt
and those at very distant times in the future. Such an assumption is comple=
tely
inconsistent with the way in that social decisions are made in general. In =
the
case of global warming, consistent arguments exist to give a value to tempo=
rary
storage of carbon, although of course this value does not need to be the fu=
ll
value that would represent a permanent storage of the carbon. Global warming
alters the probabilities of droughts, floods and other disasters, which, af=
ter
the temperature increase, can be assumed to remain higher forever. Therefor=
e,
any postponement of global warming represents a permanent earnings of all t=
he
damages that would have occurred during the temporary time interval that the
warming was postponed. In other words, time has value (Fearnside et al.,
2000).
This value can be incorporated into carbon
accounting in several ways, in addition to the traditional mechanism in
economics of applying a discount rate. Choosing a time horizon has this eff=
ect,
for instance the 100-year time horizon already adopted by the Kyoto Protocol
for the global warming potentials (GWPs) used to translate the impact of the
various gases into CO2-equivalents. In the Special Report on Land
Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (SR-LULUCF) of the Intergovernmental Pane=
l on
Climate Change (IPCC), different proposed accounting methods are reviewed,
including “ton-year” methods that would allow equivalences to be
established between permanent and temporary storage of carbon (Noble et al.,
2000).
It is important to understand that credit is only
received for carbon that is actually stored, not for promises. While critics view liability issues
under the CDM as “essentially insoluable” (Lanchbery, 2000),
ton-year accounting offers a mechanism for rewarding carbon benefits as they
are achieved, thus obviating the need for liability arrangements (Fearnside=
et
al., 2000). However, in order=
to
grant credit up-front in a manner comparable to energy projects, liability
could be assumed. Certified emissions reductions (CERs) with finite periods=
of
validity have been proposed under what is known as the “Colombian
Proposal” (Blanco and Forner, 2000).=
Under this proposal, the CERs would expire when the carbon is emitte=
d to
the atmosphere for whatever reason, and the country holding the CER would h=
ave
to either reduce national emissions by that amount or buy the same number of
CERs from another forestry project.
Two small modifications to the Colombian Proposal have been proposed=
by
Kerr and Leining (2000) with which this proposal could effectively solve the
permanence issue if adopted: provision for verification at least once per
commitment period with immediate payback of CERs if carbon has been lost, a=
nd
liability for payback being carried with ownership of specific CERs.
The treatment of the non-permanence of carbon in
forests depends io the means adopted for compensating the climatic benefits=
of
the projects. Payment could only be made after the atmospheric benefits take
place, such that a liability system is not necessary to cover the case of
non-delivery of the expected benefits. Although this has the advantages of =
the
simplicity and of minimizing risks, it also implies the loss of part of the
financial value of the projects when compared to projects in the energy sec=
tor,
which would receive payment in advance due to the presumed certainty of the
permanence of the carbon offsets. The “Colombian proposal” would
create temporary credits for forest projects, with the requirement that the=
y be
replaced by the buyer at the end of the period, either with a permanent cre=
dit
(for instance from fossil fuel), or with another temporary credit.
4.1.2.
Baselines
One of the criticisms frequently raised against including avoided deforestation in the CDM it is that it would be impossibl= e to establish reliable baselines. The baseline is the scenario without the mitigation project, which is compared with the observed stocks of carbon af= ter the project to calculate the carbon gain. It is important to understand tha= t, although constructing baselines is not easy, it is also neither impossible = nor inherently different from the problems with baselines in the energy sector.= In all cases it involves a control scenario of the future without the project, which is necessarily counterfactual. Difficulties exist in modeling future deforestation (Carvalho et al., 2001; Laurance et al., 2001; Nepstad et al., 2000), but Brazil has a great advantage in this area compared to other trop= ical countries due to the series of surveys of deforestation that the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) has carried out (Brazil, INPE, 2001). <= o:p>
&=
nbsp; An
objection sometimes raised against inclusion of avoided deforestation in the
CDM is that a large part of the deforestation that takes place is illegal, =
and
therefore any payment to enforce the law implies a reward for a illegal act=
s if
the value is derived from a baseline that represents an illegal situation.
However, there is nothing in the Protocol that demands that the baseline be
based on legality instead of using a description of reality independent of =
the
legal situation. Using the real situation is consistent with basing the
calculations only on things that can be seen from satellites, thereby
minimizing the chances of situations where carbon credit ends up being gran=
ted
for projects that do not produce real benefits for climate.
&=
nbsp;
4.1.3. Leakage
&=
nbsp; “Leakage”
is the loss of carbon that a project provokes indirectly, outside of the
physical or temporal boundaries of the project or outside of the conceptual
boundaries of the subject under study. For instance, if a forest reserve is
created and the people who would be deforesting in that place otherwise sim=
ply
move to another place in the forest to clear, the emissions from the cleari=
ng
would represent “leakage.” In some situations this type of prob=
lem
can be prevented through “leakage contracts”, as was done in
Bolivia in the case of the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project, where logging
companies were legally bound (with provisions for inspection) to not invest=
the
funds they received in logging operations elsewhere (Brown et al., 2000a,b)=
. A
generic way to minimize the leakage problem is supporting projects in the a=
rea
of deforestation avoidance through large-scale regional programs instead of
localized projects (Fearnside, 1995b).
4.1.4. Verification
&=
nbsp; An
inherent problem with forest maintenance projects for global warming mitiga=
tion
is that virtually all parties have conflicts of interest leading to biases =
in
the same direction: exaggeration of the benefits. Imagine, for example, a hypothetic=
al
proposal to preserve a tract of forest in a tropical country. The government of the tropical cou=
ntry
would have an interest in exaggerating the carbon benefits of the project,
because more credit would be earned.
An industrialized country financing the project would likewise want =
the
benefits exaggerated, as its investment in the project would yield more cre=
dit
towards the country’s Kyoto Protocol commitments. Environmental NGOs that want to use
carbon projects as means of maintaining tropical forests for their biodiver=
sity
will also want the carbon accounting to indicate the highest possible clima=
te
benefit. Local communities wi=
ll
want carbon benefits to be large, since the amount of money represented by
their slice of the correspondingly greater financial flows will increase.
4.1.5. Uncertainty
Provisions
to restrict the amount of uncertainty in carbon mitigation calculations have
substantial potential losses for climate and other interests because they
threaten to remove credit for avoided deforestation projects with major
potential for large “jackpot” carbon gains if effective.
4.2. Non-carbon considerat=
ions
4.2.1. Biodiversity
Biodiversity maintenance is an important benefit=
of
avoided deforestation that is not attained by other mitigation measures suc=
h as
promoting energy efficiency, planting eucalyptus or no-till agriculture.
Strong parallels are evident between European NGO
discourse and the “right to life” (anti-abortion) lobby in the =
&=
nbsp; Decisions
on what global warming mitigation measures should be supported involves a m=
ix
of considerations that includes the various values not related to global
warming that are associated with different outcomes. In addition to the “hidden
agendas” of the European Union and the Brazilian foreign ministry, mo=
re
appropriate environmental concerns include the biodiversity value of
maintaining tropical forests, as compared to other mitigation options such =
as
planting eucalyptus or promoting, no-till agriculture. The environmental and social impac=
ts of
mitigation options, such as large hydropower projects, mega-plantations or
nuclear energy contrast with the “ancillary” benefits of forest
maintenance.
4.2.2. Sustainable Development
=
; An important aspect of=
the
CDM is that Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, which creates the CDM, explic=
itly
states that the primary objective of the projects is sustainable development. Therefore, it is essential to clar=
ify
who defines what “sustainable development” is and what criteria
characterize a project as conforming to this requirement. One line of
diplomatic thought holds that sustainable development should be defined by =
each
country for itself. Since all of the proposals for projects are sent to the
Executive Council of the CDM by the CDM office of the government of the cou=
ntry
where the proposed project would be located, any project that is forwarded =
to
the Executive Council implicitly already has the approval of the country in=
terms
of sustainable development, rendering the sustainable development clause in
Article 12 completely innocuous. Although attractive because it avoids any
possibility of undesirable influence on development decisions in the countr=
y,
this line of thought also implies disadvantages in cases like
The concept of sustainable development requires
leaving future generations with the conditions needed to satisfy their own
needs (Brundtland Commission, 1987), which implies both disqualifying proje=
cts
with serious environmental and social impacts and offering the possibility =
of
providing some type of additional bonus for projects that make positive
contributions in this sense, for example in alleviating social inequalities=
and
maintaining biodiversity. Therefore two possible complementary mechanisms e=
xist,
one to supply a screen against harmful projects and the other to reward
projects with positive contributions. These possibilities are discussed in =
the
IPCC’s SR-LULUCF (Noble et al., 2000).
5. Conclusions
&n=
bsp; The
issue of saving tropical forests as a global warming countermeasure has spa=
rked
tremendous controversy and divisiveness among and within NGOs and
governments. While the debate=
is
often couched in scientific terms and with appeals to high universal princi=
ples,
the positions of the different partisans to the debate are better understoo=
d in
terms of hidden agendas, whether conscious or not. In the case of European government=
s,
which oppose inclusion of forests in the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism, the national positions would lead to improvement of
industrial competitiveness as compared to the
6. Acknowledgments
=
&=
nbsp; An
earlier version of this paper was presented at the III Congresso Brasilei=
ro de
Sistemas Agroflorestais, 21-25 November 2000,
7. List of acronyms
AOSIS
– Association of Small Island States
ARCA
-- Regional
CAN – Climate Action Network
CDM – Clean Development Mechanism
CER – Certified Emissions Reduction
COIAB
- Coordinating Body of Indigenous Peoples of Brazilian
COP – Conference of the Parties
CNS –National Council of Rubber Tappers=
CPT –
EDF – Environmental Defense
EIA/RIMA – Environmental Impact Study/Report on
Impact on the Environment
EU-European
FETAGRI - Federation of Agricultural Workers of Par&aacut=
e;
FOE – Friends of the Earth
=
G-7—Group
of seven:
=
G-77+China-Group
of 77 and
GTA – Amazon Working Group
GWP—Global Warming Potential
INPE – National Institute for Space Research
IMAZON-Institute for Man and the Environment in
IPAM-Institute of
Environmental Research of
IPCC –Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Chang=
e
ISA-Socio-Environment=
al
Institute
IUCN – World Conservation
LULUCF – Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestr=
y
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
NRDC – Natural Resources Defense Council
PP-G7
- G-7 Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rainforest
SR-LULUCF – Special Report on Land Use, Land-U=
se
Change and Forestry
UCS
–
UN-FCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Cli=
mate
Change
Vitae Civilis –
Institute for Development, Environment and Peace
WWF – Worldwide Fund for Nature
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Make-or-break the
Table
1
Positions
on including land use, land-use chang=
e and
forestry projects in the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism=
(a)
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp;
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; =
Plantations Agro- Avoided
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp;
forestry
deforestation
A.)
Blocks of countries
Umbrella Group
(USA,
Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand) + =
+ &nbs=
p;
+
European
Union &n=
bsp; =
; &n=
bsp; =
; &n=
bsp; =
- =
- =
-
AOSIS
(Association of Small Island States) &=
nbsp; =
&nb=
sp;
- =
- =
-
G-77
+
B.)
International NGOs
Greenpeace-International &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; =
=
- =
- =
-
WWF-International =
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp;
- =
-
FOE-International =
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp;
- =
- =
-
Birdlife
International =
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp;
- =
- =
=
-
Climate
Action Network =
; &n=
bsp; =
&nb=
sp;
- =
- =
-
Indigenous People's Fo=
rum &=
nbsp;
on Climate Change =
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp;
- =
- =
-
C.)
US NGOs
National
and US-headquartered NGOs
EDF
(Environmental Defense) =
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
+ &nbs=
p;
+
CI
(Conservation International) =
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp;
=
+ =
+
TNC
(The Nature Conservancy) =
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
+ &nbs=
p;
+
NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council) =
&nb=
sp; =
+ =
+
UCS
(
Branches
or affiliates of International NGOs
WWF-US &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; =
&nb=
sp; =
- =
- -
FOE-US &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; =
=
&nb=
sp; - =
- =
; -
D.) Brazilian NGOs
National
NGOs
CNS (National Council of
Rubber
Tappers) =
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp;
+ =
; &n=
bsp;
+
GTA (Amazonian Working
Group) =
&nb=
sp; =
+<=
span
style=3D'mso-tab-count:2'> &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p;
+
COIAB
(Coordinating Body of Indigenous
Peoples of Brazilian
FETAGRI
(Federation of Agricultural
Work=
ers of
Pará) =
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
+ &=
nbsp;
+
CPT
(
IMAZON
(Institute for Man and the
=
Environment in
IPAM
(Institute of Environmental
=
Research of
ISA
(Socio-Environmental Institute) =
; =
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp;
+ =
; &n=
bsp;
+
Vitae
Civilis (Institute
for Development,
Environment and Peace = = &nb= sp; - <= /span>- = = -
Branches
or affiliates of International NGOs
Friends
of the Earth--Brazilian
Friends
of the Earth--
Greenpeace-São Paulo =
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
- =
- =
; <=
/span>
-
WWF-Brazil&=
nbsp; =
&nb=
sp;
=
&nb=
sp; =
- =
- =
;
-
(a)
Plus sign indicates favoring inclusion, minus sign opposing, and blank
indicates no position. Often, NGOs that support avoided deforestation and
agroforestry and do not have positions on silvicultural plantations would be
likely to oppose many plantation projects on the basis of their environment=
al
and social impacts (not on the basis of carbon accounting). The G-77 +
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